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Abstract
Verbal reports of examinees' thinking on test items can provide useful validation data only if the verbal
reporting does not change the course of examinees' thinking and performance. Using a completely
randomized factorial design, 343 senior high school students were divided into five groups. In four of
the groups, different procedures were used to elicit students' thinking as they worked through Part A of
a critical thinking test of observation appraisal (Norris & King, 1983). In the control group, students
took the same test in paper-and-pencil format. There were no significant differences in test
performance among the five groups, nor in the quality of thinking among the four elicitation groups.
These results are evidence that verbal reports of thinking meet one of the necessary conditions of
useful validation data, namely, that collecting the data not influence examinees' thinking and
performance. Since verbal reports of thinking can also contain a wealth of information on the
psychological processes that underlie performance, they are a potentially important source of validation
information.
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VERBAL REPORTS OF THINKING AS DATA
FOR VALIDATING MULTIPLE-CHOICE TESTS
Verbal reports of examinees' thinking are often recommended as relevant and important sources of
evidence for validating tests (Anastasi, 1988; Cronbach, 1971; Ennis & Norris, in press; Haney & Scott,
1987; Messick, in press; Norris, in press-b, in press-c). Sometimes the proposed relevance is indirect,
as when verbal reports of thinking are used to develop information processing models of test
performance which, in turn, are directly relevant to assessing construct validity (Embretson, 1983;
Embretson, Schneider, & Roth, 1986). Verbal reports of thinking have been used in test validation
(Bloom & Broder, 1950; Connolly & Wantman, 1964; Haney & Scott, 1987; Kropp, 1956; McGuire,
1963; Schuman, 1966) but, possibly because of past emphasis on behavioristic approaches, not
extensively. With the growing emphasis on cognitive approaches, it is likely they will receive greater
attention (Afflerbach & Johnston, 1984; Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984), so studies of their usefulness
for validating tests that go beyond mere recommendations and theoretical rationales are needed.
This study examined the relevance of the data from verbal reports of thinking on test items for
validating multiple-choice tests that would be taken normally in paper-and-pencil format. A necessary
condition for the data to be relevant is that the verbal reporting not alter examinees' thinking and
performance from what it would have been had they taken the test in its paper-and-pencil format. The
satisfaction of this condition is often taken for granted, but this assumption is not warranted. There is
no firm evidence which shows whether or not asking examinees to report on their thinking while taking
tests affects the course of their thought. The purpose of the study was to gather such evidence.
There is pertinent evidence on the effects of verbal reporting on the course of thought from outside
testing contexts. For example, research on eyewitness testimony has shown that testimony given in
response to non-leading questions tends to be more accurate than testimony given in response to
leading questions (Clifford & Scott, 1978; Dale, Loftus, & Rathbun, 1978; Harris, 1973; Hilgard &
Loftus, 1979; Lipton, 1977; Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Marquis, Marshall, & Oskamp, 1972).
This result is pertinent to the problem raised here to the extent that the mental processes used to
report eyewitness testimony are the same as those used to report one's thinking on test items. Some of
the processes are likely the same, since both activities involve memory retrieval. But not all the
processes are likely the same: In the eyewitness testimony situation there is recall of an observation of
an external event whereas, in the testing situation, there is recall of an internal thinking process; in the
eyewitness testimony situation memory is probed about events in the more distant past whereas, in the
testing situation, memory is probed about events in the very recent past.
Evidence from research on information processing is also pertinent to determining the effect of verbal
reporting on the course of thought. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) have concluded that instructions
to verbalize thinking do not change the course of that thinking, but merely slow it down, when subjects
are verbalizing information that would be available normally in short-term memory. However, they
claim that specific and directive probes, especially requests for motivations and reasons, alter cognitive
processing. These findings are particularly important because, if they generalize to the testing context,
they cast doubt on recommendations to use such validation techniques as "analysis of reasons"
(Messick, in press), which probe for examinees' reasons for answers. However, it is not known whether
or not they do generalize.
This study addressed the following general question: Does the elicitation of verbal reports of thinking
on multiple-choice items requiring deliberative thought alter the course of examinees' thinking and
performance on those items from what it would have been had they answered the items in paper-and-
pencil format without reporting verbally on their thinking? Only if the answer is negative can verbal
reports of thinking on multiple-choice tests requiring deliberative thought be relevant to the validity of
those tests in the context of their paper-and-pencil use. However, even if the answer is negative, this
does not automatically mean that verbal reports of thinking are useful for multiple-choice test
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validation. Maybe, for instance, the verbal reporting does not alter the course of examinees' thinking
and performance, but reveals so little about their thinking that it is worthless. The study did not
directly address this issue, but nevertheless provided some information on it.
The focus of the study was the validation of multiple-choice tests that require deliberative thought. I
am not concerned here with tests that require rote recall, but rather ones that require deliberate
reasoning to figure out the answers. This is a broad and somewhat vague category. It includes tests of
higher order thinking within specific school subjects, tests of critical thinking, tests of inference in
reading, and problem solving and decision making tests. I focussed on multiple-choice tests for three
reasons: (a) they are widely used because they fit very well the pragmatic constraints of many testing
situations; (b) they are widely criticized as tests of deliberative thought (e.g., McPeck, 1981; Petrie,
1986) on the grounds that they provide weak evidence on thinking processes; and (c) it is this very
weakness (if it exists) in the evidence that multiple-choice tests provide on thinking processes that
verbal reports of thinking can plausibly eliminate.
Method
Sample
Five senior high schools were chosen from communities on the east coast of Newfoundland, Canada.
The communities ranged from single-industry fishing and industrial communities with less than 1,000
people to a somewhat larger town of about 5,000, situated close to several similarly sized communities.
This group of communities had a diverse economic base in fishing, government offices (including a
police headquarters, a jail, and a court), tourism, light manufacturing, and shopping malls. The total
sample consisted of 343 students, including all of the students in grades 10, 11, and 12 in four of the
schools and about half of those in the other. This sample represented a broad range of student
abilities. Although all the schools were in small communities, they were within commuting distance of
the capital city and indeed many of the teachers commuted every day. Thus, the schools experienced
little trouble in attracting highly qualified teachers. The students in these schools scored at or above
the national average on the Canadian Test of Basic Skills.
Instrumentation
The task was supplied by Part A of the Test on Appraising Observations (Norris & King, 1983). The
Test on Appraising Observations is a multiple-choice test of one aspect of critical thinking, the ability
to judge the credibility of reports of observations. The test has been rated highly in a recent survey of
tests for assessing higher order thinking (Arter & Salmon, 1987). Part A has 28 items written in the
context of a traffic accident at an intersection. In each item two people, either witnesses to the accident
or individuals involved in it, report on what they observed happening. Examinees are to judge which, if
either, of the reports is more credible. Relevant factors to consider in making judgments include the
observer's expertise, alertness, and conflict of interest; the satisfactoriness of the observation
conditions; and the source of the observation and the statement reporting it.
Here is Item 1 as an example:
A policeman is questioning Pierre and Martine. They were in their car at the
intersection but were not involved in the accident. Martine is the driver and Pierre,
who had been trying to figure out which way to go, is the map reader.
The policeman asks Martine how many cars were at the intersection when the
accident occurred. She answers, "There were three cars."
Pierre says, "No, there wdre five cars."
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Examinees are instructed to choose which, if either, of the two underlined statements they have more
reason to believe. The item is intended to test ability to recognize that the driver is likely to be more
alert to the road conditions than the map reader and, therefore, that Martine's report is more credible,
since all other factors appear equal.
Procedure
A completely randomized factorial design was used to study four ways of eliciting verbal reports of
subjects' thinking as they worked on the test. Students were selected one at a time according to the
order of alphabetical class lists. They were assigned randomly to one of five groups, either to one of
four elicitation groups or to a control group. The groups are described in Table 1. An associate and I
worked with students independently, each of us choosing the next available student on the list.
The verbal report elicitation procedures vary in the degree to which they lead examinees to provide
particular sorts of information. The think aloud elicitation gives subjects the freedom to report as they
see fit, and parallels the "free report" which yields the most accurate eyewitness testimony (Loftus,
1979). Subsequent elicitations request particular types of information and are thus more directive of
the task to be carried out. The immediate recall elicitation requests reasons for answers selected, and
was thus used to test the efficacy of Messick's (in press) proposed "analysis of reasons" and Ericsson's
and Simon's (1980, 1984) claim that requests for reasons alter the course of thinking. The criteria
probe and principle probe elicitations attempt to lead examinees by the questions asked, and thus were
used to study the generalizability of the results from eyewitness testimony research on leading
questions. In each group, subjects were told that they could go back to change their answers at any
time. As an example, the elicitation procedures for Item 1 are described in Table 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.]
Tape-recorded verbal reports of thinking on items 1-15 were obtained from subjects in the elicitation
groups. These subjects completed the remaining 13 items on Part A working privately in a paper-and-
pencil format. Subjects in the control group worked privately in a paper-and-pencil format through all
28 items on Part A.
From the raw data, three sets of scores were derived. The concurrent performance score for each
subject equalled the total number of items 1-15 answered correctly according to the key provided in the
test manual (Norris & King, 1985). The subsequent performance score for each subject equalled the
total answered correctly for items 16-28. The scores were called "concurrent" and "subsequent"
because, for the elicitation groups, items 1-15 were done concurrently with verbal reporting and items
16-28 were done subsequently to it, working privately in a paper-and-pencil format.
A thinking score was assigned for items 1-15 for all subjects in the elicitation groups. For each item, the
quality of each subject's critical thinking displayed in his or her verbal report was rated on a scale of 0-3
in accord with the procedure in Norris and King (1984) and these ratings totalled over the 15 items for
each student. Thinking scores were assigned independently of the answers chosen.
Results
There were two main results: (a) the elicitation of verbal reports of thinking did not alter subjects'
performance and, by inference, did not alter their thinking; and (b) the different procedures for
eliciting verbal reports yielded essentially the same information of the quality of subjects' thinking.
Verbal Reporting and Performance
Two analyses support the conclusion that verbal reporting did not alter test performance. In the first,
concurrent performance score was the dependent variable. This analysis determined whether giving
Norris
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verbal reports of thinking affected ongoing performance. In the second analysis, subsequent
performance score was the dependent variable. The analysis determined whether there was a carry-
over effect from verbal reporting, possibly as a result of learning different things through the verbal
reporting.
Two 5 x 3 x 2 x 2 fixed effects analyses of variance were performed with interview group, grade level,
interviewer, and sex as the independent variables. This allowed on average between 5 and 6
observations per cell using the total sample of 343 subjects. In both analyses, the four-way interaction
mean square was combined with the error term.
Table 3 contains mean concurrent and subsequent performance scores for each level of the four factors
examined. All differences among means are small, being on the order of about 0.5. Neither analysis
showed significant interaction effects. For concurrent performance, there was a significant main effect
for interviewer only (F(1,290) = 3.35, 2 < .05). No significant differences in performance were found
among the elicitation levels. For subsequent performance, significant differences for interviewer
(F(1,290) = 2.88, 9 < .05), sex (E(1,290) = 7.19, p < .01), and grade level (F(2,290) = 7.70, v < .01)
were found. Again, no significant differences were found among the elicitation levels.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Verbal Reporting and Quality of Thinking
Two analyses were performed: a quantitative and a qualitative. In the quantitative analysis, thinking
score was taken as the dependent variable and elicitation group, grade level, interviewer, and sex as
independent variables in a 4 x 3 x 2 x 2 fixed effects analysis of variance. This analysis allowed on
average between 5 and 6 observations per cell given the 271 subjects in the four elicitation groups. The
control group was excluded from this analysis, since they had not given verbal reports of their thinking
and therefore could not be given thinking scores.
Table 4 gives mean thinking scores for each level of the four factors. Differences are on the order of 1
point or less. On the 15 item section, subjects averaged less than 1 point per item out of a total
possible of 3 points per item.1 No significant interaction or main effects were found.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
A qualitative analysis of the course of students' thinking was conducted of a random sample of 40, 10
from each elicitation group, of the total sample of 271 students who gave verbal reports. Seven
categories of verbal moves were derived from the verbal reports of thinking:
1. Citing Factual Details - either recalling a factual detail given in an item prior to the one currently
being done, recalling such a prior detail incorrectly, or stating a detail in the current item;
2. Asking Rhetorical Questions - posing questions which appear to be directed to the subject himself
or herself rather than to the interviewer;
3. Making Evaluations - either evaluating judgments or conclusions which had been explicitly stated
previously, or evaluating ones which had not been verbalized;
4. Constructing Supporting Assumptions - either making detailed factual assumptions specific to the
current item, or making more generalized assumptions of broad principles of appraisal or causal
laws covering more than the situation in the current item;
5. Using Attention Control Devices - either making comments about the stage of progress reached in
reasoning through the problem, or commenting on the direction reasoning should proceed;
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6. Interacting with the Experimenter - directing comments or questions to the experimenter;
7. Pausing - either interjecting (Ahhh! Mmmm!), or being silent.
The verbal reports were coded according to the seven categories and occurrences were accumulated
across the 10 subjects for each category. No statistical analysis was performed. The data were taken as
exploratory and examined for general trends with a view to more systematic exploration in the future.
The question asked was whether elicitation group membership affected the course of thinking in ways
that were detectable by the above seven categories. The frequencies of each verbal move recorded in
Table 5 suggest little systematic difference among elicitation groups. While there are clear differences
among the verbal move categories, with some having occurred on the order of hundreds of times and
others on the order of tens of times, a striking feature is that the order of magnitude of the frequency
for each verbal move is the same for each elicitation group.
[Insert Table S about here.]
Discussion
The results support the conclusion that verbal reports of thinking on multiple-choice test items can
provide relevant data on the validity of the tests taken in paper-and-pencil format. The conclusion has
long been supported on theoretical and intuitive grounds. But it was not known whether a necessary
condition for the relevance of verbal reports was satisfied, namely, that the reporting process not alter
the course of thinking and performance from what it would have been had the test been taken in paper-
and-pencil format. The results provide evidence that the condition is satisfied.
The analysis of verbal reporting and performance showed that test performance under a variety of
elicitation procedures, from the nonleading request to think aloud to the leading questions about the
role of specific pieces of information, is the same as performance in a paper-and-pencil sitting with no
elicitation. The best explanation of this equivalent performance is that, on average, subjects in the
elicitation and control groups thought equivalently. If eliciting the verbal reports altered the course of
subjects' thinking, then this alteration should have been manifested in different performance scores
between the elicitation groups and the control group. While theoretically possible, it is hard to imagine
how subjects in the elicitation and control groups could have performed equivalently but thought
significantly differently.
The analysis of verbal reporting and quality of thinking showed that there were no significant
differences in the quality of thinking, as measured by thinking scores, across the four elicitation groups.
The qualitative analysis of verbal reports revealed that there was no essential difference in the patterns
of verbal moves used in reporting under different elicitation procedures. These results suggest strongly
that it is the task presented by the items and not how subjects' thinking is elicited that governs what
they report. Overall, the results support the use of verbal reports of thinking in validating multiple-
choice tests.
Furthermore, the results suggest that special care need not be taken to avoid leading questions when
eliciting reports of thinking, because examinees were not led easily when reporting on their thinking.
Nevertheless, prudence may suggest a more cautious approach. Given the evidence on the effect of
leading questions in other domains and given that there was basically no difference in the information
obtained using either elicitation procedure, it may be more sensible to use the least directive (think
aloud) elicitation. A similar note of caution can be extended to Messick's (in press) proposal to
analyze subjects' reasons for their answer choices as a source of data on validity. Given that Ericsson
and Simon (1980, 1984) specifically caution that requests for reasons alter the course of thought and
given that such requests seem to deliver nothing beyond a request to think aloud, the latter approach
might be preferred.
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Type II Error
Was this experiment sufficiently powerful to detect any true differences which existed among the
groups? There are a number of reasons that make it highly plausible that differences would have been
detected had they been present in the population. The first is the fact that the elicitation procedures
were considerably different from the control procedure. It is quite different for high school students to
work alone on a test in a way that normally occurs in school than to work in the presence of a stranger
who is probing their thinking in a way that hardly ever happens in school. Thus, if elicitations of verbal
reports of thinking have an effect on the course of performance, then it should have been revealed in
differences in performance between the elicitation and control groups.
A second reason for thinking that any true differences would have been detected is that the elicitation
procedures were considerably different from each other, but produced no differential effects. The
leading probes were quite leading, because they made explicit suggestions to students about what could
have affected their choices of answers. It would have been easy for students to conform to these
suggestions. Instead, they regularly denied that the suggested factor had anything to do with their
thinking and proceeded to explain how their choices were made. Students seemed to report what made
sense to them and what was consistent with their own thinking.
Any effect on performance of the leading criteria probe and principle probe elicitations would not
necessarily appear in the item being done. In these two treatments, students first chose their answers
and then were asked the questions about whether specific pieces of information affected their choices.
So, the elicitation could not have affected their original answer choice. However, students knew they
could change their answers at any time, but such changes were made rarely. Also, the elicitation for
one item could have affected performance on subsequent items. Students could have predicted on the
basis of previous questions that they would be asked whether some specific piece of information in the
item affected their choice. Consequently, they might have been more diligent in trying to focus on what
was relevant. However, no effects of such a hypothesized increase in diligence were observed. This
result is supported by the findings of Phillips (in press) which show that students did no better on a
multiple-choice test of inference in reading, which necessarily makes the correct answers available,
than they did on a construct-response version of the same test.
Furthermore, in the think aloud and immediate recall elicitations, students knew before they started an
item what they would have to do, namely, report all they were thinking in the former treatment and
give reasons for their answer choice in the latter. Therefore, these treatments could have affected the
original answer choice on the item being done. But no differences between elicitation groups on either
performance or quality of thinking were found.
A third reason making the results of this experiment plausible is that effects were sought from a
number of directions, but were found in none of them. Among the elicitation groups, there were no
differences either in the quality of students' thinking or in the patterns of verbal moves that typified
their verbal reports. Between the elicitation and control groups, there were no differences either for
performance concurrent with reporting or subsequent to it. It is plausible to think that if differences
existed they would have been detected by at least one of these methods.
In addition to the above considerations, an analysis of the statistical power of the experiment,
performed using techniques described in Kirk (1968, pp. 9-11, and pp. 107-108), showed <3% chance
of a Type II error overall. The analysis requires the calculation of a parameter and the use of charts
based upon a procedure by Tang (1938). The parameter is given by:.
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where:
= sum of squared treatment effects
S = size of the jth sample
S= error variance.
In the calculation, (k-1/n) MSBG - MSw•) was taken as an unbiased estimate of the sum of squared
treatment effects, and MSWG as an unbiased estimate of the population error variance. With the
probability of a Type I error set at 0.05 for each analysis, the probability of Type II error was calculated
to be <1% for the analyses of verbal reporting and performance and <3% for the analysis of verbal
reporting and quality of thinking.
Context-Specific Effects
In the introduction, I limited the study to verbal reports of thinking on multiple-choice tests requiring
deliberative thought. Verbal reports of thinking seem useful for validating such tests, because
examinees plausibly would have something to say about how they chose their answers. On a test of
rote recall or some other automatic process, subjects by definition are unlikely to have access to their
thinking. So, collecting verbal reports of thinking does not make sense in this latter context. This
intuition is supported by Bereiter and Bird (1985), who also believe that verbal reports of thinking
would be most useful in activities requiring deliberative thought. Such activities would include the
critical thinking task used in this study and other critical thinking tasks, problem solving and decision
making tasks, subject matter tasks requiring deliberation and reflection instead of rote recall, and tests
of reading comprehension which require deliberative thinking such as some tests of inference and other
higher order processes in reading.
The need and desire to think deliberatively may help explain why different elicitation procedures did
not affect thinking in the situation studied in this experiment, but why eyewitness testimony research
consistently shows differential effects on the accuracy of verbal reports for different elicitation
procedures. Students thought deliberatively on the test because the task required it and, even though
the test did not count for school grades, the students wanted to portray themselves as capable people.
There is some evidence that subjects in eyewitness testimony experiments may not deliberate about
their task in this way. In a critical analysis of eyewitness testimony research, McCloskey and Egeth
(1983) contended that while laboratory research suggests that "jurors" place an unwarranted amount of
confidence in eyewitness testimony, studies of real jurors do not show this tendency. Real-life jurors
tend to be skeptical of evidence and deliberative in their thinking in order to maintain the presumption
of innocence. Maintaining a presumption of innocence is not crucial in psychological experiments.
Implications
Verbal reports of thinking would be useful in the validation of multiple-choice tests of deliberative
thinking if they could provide evidence for judging whether good thinking was in general associated
with choosing keyed answers and poor thinking with choosing unkeyed answers. This study focussed
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primarily on one necess'ary condition for this usefulness to exist, namely, that giving verbal reports does
not alter the course of thinking and performance. But even if, as the evidence suggests, they do not
alter thinking or performance, they must contain enough information to allow comparisons to be made
between the quality of examinees' thinking and their chosen answers.
In fact, the verbal reports of thinking contained a wealth of information useful for rating the quality of
subjects' thinking and for diagnosing specific problems with items, such as the presence of misleading
expressions, implicit clues, unfamiliar vocabulary, and alternative justifiable answers to the one keyed
correct (Norris, in press-a, in press-c). Given the results of this study, it is reasonable to trust this
diagnostic information as an accurate representation of problems that would occur with the items taken
in paper-and-pencil format.
Multiple-choice tests are popular largely because of their ease of administration and scoring. But the
source of this popularity leads to criticisms of them. One criticism is that multiple-choice tests
intended to examine deliberative thought and not mere rote recall provide no direct evidence of the
reasoning examinees use to choose their answers. On account of this criticism, many educators believe
that multiple-choice testing encourages an overemphasis on getting the right answers and undervalues
careful reasoning. A systematic procedure for quantifying and using the data in verbal reports of
thinking for developing and validating multiple-choice tests can overcome this criticism. Multiple-
choice tests could be developed for which the evidence from verbal reports of thinking indicate that, ingeneral, sound thinking is associated with choosing keyed answers and unsound thinking with choosing
unkeyed answers (Norris, in press-a). Verbal reports of thinking thus offer the prospect of developing
multiple-choice tests which can serve both the desires for efficiency and cost-effectiveness and
educational quality.
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Footnote
1I have subsequently concluded that the 3-point thinking score scale was not suitable. To get 3
points, students had to generalize beyond the specific situation of the item by referring to a general
principle of critical thinking under which the specific case fell. Hardly any students did this and I now
believe that it is pedantic to expect it. Therefore, the effective thinking score range is 0-2 per item, or
0-30 for the 15 items for which students gave verbal reports of their thinking. Thus, students averaged
8.7 on the 30-point scale.
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Table 1
Description of Elicitation Levels
Elicitation Level Description
Think Aloud Elicitation
Immediate Recall Elicitation
Criteria Probe Elicitation
Principle Probe Elicitation
No Elicitation (Control)
Subjects were instructed to report all they were
thinking as they worked through an item and to
mark their answer on a standardized answer sheet.
Subjects were asked to mark their answer to an
item on a standardized answer sheet and to tell why
they chose the answer they did.
Subjects were asked to mark their answer on a
standardized answer sheet and then to tell whether
a piece of information pointed out in the item at
that time had made any difference to the answer
they chose.
Subjects were treated as in the criteria probe group
with an additional question asking whether their
choice of answer was based upon particular general
principles.
Subjects were not interviewed, but were instructed
to work alone on the test and to mark their answers
on a standardized answer sheet.
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Table 2
Verbal Report Elicitation Procedures for Item 1
Elicitation Instructions to Subjects
Think Aloud
Immediate Recall
Criteria Probe
Try to tell me all that comes to your mind as you
think about this question.
Tell me which answer you choose and why you
choose that answer.
Which answer do you choose? .... Did the fact
that Pierre is the map reader affect your choice?
Which answer do you choose? .... Did the fact
that Pierre is the map reader affect your choice?
.... If "No," go on to the next item. If "Yes," ask:
What difference did it make to your thinking that
he is the map reader?
Principle Probe
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Table 3
Mean Concurrent and Subsequent Performance for Elicitation Level, Interviewer,
Sex, and Grade Level
Mean Mean
Concurrent Subsequent
Factor Level Performance Performance
Elicitation No Elicitation (Control) 7.8 8.4
Think Aloud 8.0 8.4
Immediate Recall 83 8.3
Criteria Probe 7.9 8.6
Principle Probe 7.6 8.1
Interviewer A 7.6 8.2
B 8.2 8.5
Sex M 7.7 8.0
F 8.0 8.7
Grade Level 10 7.8 7.8
11 7.7 8.6
12 8.1 8.8
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Table 4
Mean Thinking Scores for Elicitation Group, Interviewer, Sex, and Grade Level
Factor Level Mean Thinking Score
Elicitation Group
Interviewer
Sex
Think Aloud
Immediate Recall
Criteria Probe
Principle Probe
A
B
M
F
10
11
12
Grade Level
7.9
9.2
8.8
9.0
8.1
93
9.2
83
8.2
8.6
9.5
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Table 5
Frequency of Verbal Moves by Elicitation Group
Elicitation Group
Think Immed. Crit. Princ.
Verbal Moves Aloud Recall Probe Probe
Citing Factual Details 104 139 99 139
Asking Rhetorical Questions 16 9 2 5
Making Evaluations 45 24 39 43
Constructing Assumptions 178 228 214 227
Controlling Attention 26 25 15 19
Interacting with Experimenter 19 9 12 13
Pausing 499 387 424 380
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